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SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE RECONSIDERED1 
GÜNEY AFRİKA TECRÜBESİNİ YENİDEN GÖZDEN 
GEÇİREREK 12 EYLÜL DARBESİYLE YÜZLEŞMEK 
Gülden Gürsoy ATAMAN 
 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this article is to determine whether 
particular processes, mechanisms and principles 
employed to deal with the past in one society can be 
applied to another with a different legacy of past abuses. 
This question will be answered by analyzing applicability 
of some of the practices and principles of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Turkey 
where there are an ongoing prosecutions regarding the 12 
September 1980 Coup D’état. It concludes that “truth 
commission” as a transitional justice measure can be 
adopted in Turkey and complement trials due to the 
limitations and shortcomings of the indictment and 
prosecution process. However, only certain aspects of the 
                                                          
1 This article is revised and shortened version of the dissertation submitted to the University of 
Essex, for the degree of Master of Arts in Theory and Practice of Human Rights at the end of 
2011-2012 Academic Term. It is also an enlarged and updated version of the article, which won 
the Human Rights Essay Prize by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in 2013.  I would like to thank my adviser Prof. Rainer Schulze for his 
invaluable guidance and support throughout my masters research and Prof. Dr. Mine Gencel 
Bek for her encouragement to write on this topic. I am indebted to Assist. Prof. Şerife Çam and 
Assoc. Prof. Kerem Altıparmak for their constructive and insightful comments on the first draft 
of this article. I am also thankful to Lawyer Mehmet Horuş for providing me with the court 
documents and giving his time to answer some of my questions. Special thanks go to my 
husband Hakan for his encouragement, patience, love and support. Needles to say, all errors, 
misconceptions and misrepresentations remain my own.  
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South African TRC can be relevant for a future truth 
commission in Turkey, as there is no one-size-fits-for-all 
model for transitional justice and as the practices and the 
principles of the South African TRC is historically and 
politically contingent. It is argued that that the public, 
institutional and thematic hearings should be core 
elements of a future truth commission in Turkey as they 
have a capacity to demonstrate broader social context of 
large-scale abuses and to establish collective 
responsibility regarding the 12 September 1980 coup 
d’état as well as to create a space for victims’ to share 
their plight. New truths to guide the society should be 
adopted as they enable the re-presentations or re-
interpretation of the facts, which were used to justify 
systemic use of violence and, therefore, show that these 
abuses are not justified. However, granting individualized 
amnesty for crimes against humanity should not be 
embraced it may not conform to international law and by 
contributing to on-going legacy of impunity, it might 
cause serious problems in terms of achieving 
reconciliation.  
Keywords: Transitional justice, truth commissions, 
prosecution, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 12 September 1980 Coup D’état Trial  
ÖZ 
Bu makalenin amacı bir toplumda geçmişle yüzleşmek için 
kullanılan süreç, mekanizma ve ilkelerin, farklı ihlal 
geçmişine sahip bir toplumda uygulanıp 
uygulamayacağını belirlemektir. Bunun için Güney 
Afrika Hakikat ve Uzlaşma Komisyonu’nda izlenen bazı 
ilke ve pratiklerin Türkiye’de 12 Eylül Darbesi’yle 
yüzleşmek üzere benimsenip benimsenmeyeceği 
incelecektir. Bu çalışma,  bir geçiş dönemi/süreci adaleti 
yöntemi olarak “hakikat komisyonları”nın Türkiye’de 12 
Eylül darbesine ilişkin cezai takibatları 
tamamlayabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Bunun nedeni hem 
iddianamenin hem de yargılama sürecinin sınırlılıkları ve 
eksiklikleridir. Bununla birlikte, Güney Afrika Hakikat 
Komisyonu’nun sadece bazı yönleri Türkiye’de 
gelecekteki bir hakikat komisyonu için uygun olabilir;  
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çünkü geçiş dönemi/süreci adaleti için herkese uyan tek 
bir model yoktur. Bunun yanında, Güney Afrika Hakikat 
Komisyonu’nun bazı ilke ve pratikleri tarihsel ve siyasal 
olarak olumsaldır. Makalede kamusal (kamuya açık), 
kurumsal ve tematik oturumların gelecekteki bir 
hakikat komisyonunun en temel unsurları olması 
gerektiği belirtilmektedir. Bu oturumlar, mağdurların 
acısını paylaşacak bir alan yaratmanın yanında büyük 
ölçekli insan hakları ihlallerinin daha geniş toplumsal 
bağlamını gösterme ve 12 Eylül 1980 darbesine ilişkin 
kolektif sorumluluğu tespit etme kapasitesine sahiptir. 
Bu oturumların yanında, aynı Güney Afrika Hakikat 
Komisyonu’ndaki gibi topluma yol gösterecek yeni 
hakikatler kabul edilmelidir, çünkü bunlar sistematik 
şiddet kullanımını haklı göstermeye yarayan olguların 
yeniden yorumlanmasını ve farklı bir şekilde temsil 
edilmesini sağlayacak, böylelikle ihlallerin haklı 
olmadığını ortaya koyacaktır. Ancak insanlığa karşı 
suçlar için bireysel af uygulaması kabul edilmemelidir, 
çünkü bu hem uluslararası hukuka uygun olmayabilir 
hem de süregiden cezasızlığa katkıda bulunarak 
uzlaşmasının sağlanması açısından ciddi sorunlara yol 
açabilir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Geçiş süreci/dönemi adaleti, hakikat 
komisyonları, cezai takibat, Güney Afrika Hakikat ve 
Uzlaşma Komisyonu, 12 Eylül Davası 
INTRODUCTION 
 One of the most significant discussions in societies with the legacy of large-
scale abuses is how to best deal with the past injustices. The answer to this 
question is not simple as there is no single correct response but a multitude of 
options to consider. These include but not limited to truth telling, prosecutions, 
reparations and institutional reform. 
 Despite the multiplicity of responses to past injustice, it is not easy to adopt 
one solution among others at the policy level the because of the complexity of 
material conditions. Set against the difficulties in practice, the normative 
promises of some of the transitional justice measures such as providing 
accountability, serving justice and achieving reconciliation have been 
challenged. This raised the question of whether different processes and 
mechanisms to come to terms with the legacy of large-scale abuses are equally 
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appropriate for each society.  
 Against this background, the objective of this article is to determine 
whether particular processes, mechanisms and principles employed to deal with 
the past in one society can be applied to another with a different legacy of past 
abuses. This question will be answered by analysing the applicability of practices 
and principles of one transitional justice measure, a “particular” truth 
commission (the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ‘the 
TRC’) to another transitional context where there are an on-going prosecutions 
as well as an appeal (Turkey). 
 South Africa2 and Turkey3 were chosen as case studies for several reasons. 
These countries have pursued different models of justice in their transition 
processes. Whereas South Africa adopted restorative justice, in Turkey the 
retributive model has been maintained so far.4 Two countries have different 
legacy of past abuses. Choosing a country with similar historical experiences 
with Turkey would have rendered the task of comparison easy by providing a 
quick answer. 5  In addition to this, some features of the TRC such as being one 
of the one strongest truth commissions (Hayner, 2011), trading truth with 
individualized amnesty, incorporating many features of preceding commissions 
and presenting an important example of victim-centeredness (Sancar, 2007) 
                                                          
2 In South Africa, following the breakdown of apartheid, a truth and reconciliation commission 
was established in 1995 in order to grant an individualized amnesty to perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights through disclosure of truth (there were other criteria as well) and to 
provide national reconciliation. 
3 In Turkey, two generals were given life sentences for overthrowing the parliament and 
constitutional order in a military coup on 12 September 1980 in the judgement delivered in June 
2014. Although this trial aimed to deal with the legacy of the past, namely staging of the coup, it 
failed to come to terms with the legacy of large scale abuses, which is the defining criterion of a 
transitional justice measure. Therefore, this trial in Turkey cannot be regarded as a genuine 
transitional justice measure. Nevertheless, investigation has been extended to cover allegations of 
torture. After the 2010 referendum, in 59 cities numerous torture complaints have been filed with 
the office of the Prosecutor General. However, some of the courts dismissed the motion for the 
lack of jurisdiction. In some, there is an on-going process. Therefore, it can be said these trials in 
totality can be considered as transitional justice measures as far as they try to come to terms with 
large-scale abuses.  
4 It should be noted that a “truth commission” regarding the 12 September coup d’état was 
established in Turkey. The commission, which entitled as “Commission of Justice and 
Investigation into Diyarbakır Prison” launched its work in 2007 and completed its final report in 
2011. It investigated the facts about the gross violations of human rights in Diyarbakır Prison 
(no.5) between 1980 and 1984, by collecting statements from over 500 victims/survivors. This 
commission was a product of a civil initiative; therefore, it was an “informal truth commission”. 
Since it was informal, it cannot be said that Turkish state has adopted a restorative approach to 
deal with 12 September coup d’état.   
5 Latin America could be such an example. There are similarities between Turkey and Latin 
America in terms of being “cautious transitional regimes” where big transformations and ample 
reforms have not taken place (Bora, 2011: 94).  
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make it a very distinctive model.  Turkey is an interesting case with regards to 
inchoate process of dealing with the past; the presence of life sentences given two 
the surviving generals of the coup d’état and on-going investigations and 
prosecutions about crimes against humanity.  
 In 2007, Sancar (2007: 21) pointed out that the issue of dealing with the 
past did not resonate in academia in Turkey. This has important consequences 
as “the continuity and long-lasting effect of dealing with gross human rights 
violations in the past depends on academic discussions and scientific work” 
(Nolte, 2007: 114), among the other issues. In recent years, there has been 
change in this trend and there is a growing research interest in “dealing with the 
past in Turkey” (Dufner ve Oğan, 2007; Sancar, 2007; Bora, 2009; Ağtaş ve 
Özdinç, 2011, Günal and Özengi, 2013; Aktaş, 2014). Nevertheless, only a very 
limited number works directly addresses the 12 September 1980 coup d’état. For 
example, Altıparmak (2011) highlights the necessity of trying the perpetrators of 
the 12 September military coup and elaborates on what ground the gross human 
rights violations of 12 September Coup can be brought before the court. 
Although a truth commission has been proposed as an option for dealing with 
the 12 September coup d’état by some scholars6 and human rights activists and 
in some columns and semi-academic articles, none of these has given a detailed 
account for which aspects of what model could be applied to Turkey and why. 
This works aims at filling this gap in the literature by showing which dimensions 
of the South African model would be relevant for Turkey.  
 This research adopts a comparative (historical) analysis. Based on the 
literature on the TRC and Turkey, the court hearing records and the justified 
decision of the 12 September Case, it explores the causes and characteristics of 
the South African TRC and employs comparison to examine whether the 
methods and/or principles used in the South African TRC is relevant for Turkey. 
 The research has unavoidable limitations. Only two cases were examined 
to answer the research question. Two other main transitional justice measures, 
namely reparations and institutional reform were excluded from the analysis. In 
addition to these, not all the aspects of South African TRC and the prosecution 
process in Turkey were analysed.  
                                                          
6 For example, even before the referendum in 2010, a law scholar and human rights activist 
Assist. Prof. Levent Korkut suggested that a truth commission could be established in Turkey to 
reveal what happened in the 12 September coup d’état.  For more info: 
http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/123702-darbecileri-yargilamak-icin-gercekleri-belgelemeliyiz. A 
distinguished professor of history Timothy Garton Ash “said that truth commissions are better 
than courts for dealing with difficult past events, such as Turkey's Sept. 12, 1980 coup d'état”. 
For more info: http://www.todayszaman.com/_truth-commissions-better-than-courts-to-deal-
with-difficult-past_276749.html.  
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 This paper begins by examining the conceptualization of transitional 
justice. It, then, analyses trials and truth commissions and compares two bodies 
and gives a brief overview of transitional contexts in Africa and Turkey by 
comparing relevant dimensions of two cases. It will then evaluate the limitations 
of prosecutions in general and the shortcomings of the indictment and 
prosecution in particular in Turkey so as to demonstrate why a truth commission 
is necessary to complement the prosecution in Turkey.  Finally, it will assess 
three features of the TRC (excluding reconciliation, forgiveness, reparations and 
naming of the perpetrators) and discuss which aspects would be relevant for 
Turkey. In short, this article argues that provided that piecemeal implementation 
of transitional justice measures will deliver partial justice, a truth commission 
can complement the trial regarding the 12 September coup d’état. However, the 
TRC model cannot be applied in its entirety to Turkey. The TRC is ‘not a one-
size fits all’ mechanism and the features of the TRC are historically and 
politically contingent. It is argued that that the public, institutional and thematic 
hearings should be core elements of a future truth commission in Turkey as they 
have a capacity to demonstrate broader social context of large-scale abuses and 
to establish collective responsibility regarding the 12 September 1980 coup d’état 
as well as to create a space for victims’ to share their plight. New truths to guide 
the society should be adopted as they enable the re-presentations or re-
interpretation of the facts, which were used to justify systemic use of violence 
and, therefore, show that these abuses are not justified. Granting individualized 
amnesty (trading truth with amnesty) for crimes against humanity should not be 
embraced, as it may cause difficulties in terms of achieving reconciliation.  
1. THE FRAMEWORK OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND OF THE TERM AND CONCEPTUAL 
CLARIFICATION 
 Societies emerging from massive violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law face a difficult question about how to deal with legacies of 
their past. As there is no single correct response, they adopt various measures 
and approaches to respond to past injustice and bring about political change. 
These processes are subsumed under the framework of “transitional justice.7  
 The rise of discourse of transitional justice is related to the critique of the 
concept of simple historical progress upheld by modernist liberal theory. The 
critique pointed out that the past cannot be regarded simply as being overtaken, 
as the burden of history remains and shapes our communitarian identity. 
Therefore, the issue at stake is not whether the past would be confronted or not 
                                                          
7 I have discussed the limitations of the concept of transitional justice elsewhere (Gürsoy-
Ataman, 2012). 
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but how (De Greiff, 1996 cited in Forsberg, 2001: 58).  
 The term transitional justice was first used in 19898 and as a field it came 
into the view in late the 1980s, in relation to the new practical conditions in the 
countries where new “democracies” came into existence following an 
authoritarian regime.9 Both because of the backgrounds of the actors (human 
rights, law and comparative political science) who contributed to the field and of 
their approaches, the field and the concept have been dominated by a legal-
institutional paradigm (Arthur, 2009: 324-333). “Coming to terms with the past” 
in its complexity was only narrowly addressed (Forsberg, 2001) and remained 
marginal (Arthur, 2009).  
 The phrase “transition to democracy” was adopted to examine political 
change and became a dominant paradigm in the emerging field (Arthur, 2009).10 
The process of transition is mostly viewed intrinsically as forward moving and 
restorative. However, there are many difficulties and sometimes calamities in the 
practice of political transitions. The association of transition with only positive 
outcomes has created a huge gap between theory and practice (Dube, 2011:182- 
184). 
 The framework of “transition to democracy” was mainly directed to 
“transformation of a repressive state security apparatus” and “instauration of 
                                                          
8 Arthur (2009, p.329) shows that there are a few people who used the term around the same time 
including Ruti Teitel who claims authorship of the phrase. The first book on this issue was 
entitled as “Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes” 
edited by Neil Kritz in 1994. As the title of the book demonstrates, transitional justice was 
associated with the way that emerging democracies deal with the legacy of former regimes. The 
conceptualization offered in the book was accepted by many reviewers at the time except 
Timothy Garton Ash.  He thought that the term is not adequate to capture the complexity of new 
phenomena. Ash’s critique pointed out what was absent in the Kritz’s work: contribution of 
historians. Neither the German historians’ debate on “how to interpret Nazi Regime and the 
Holocaust” was considered in the book in details nor the historians contributed to the work 
(Arthur, 2009:331-333). 
9 “Human rights activists, lawyers and legal scholars, policy makers, journalists, donors, and 
comparative politics experts concerned with human rights and the dynamics of ‘transition to 
democracy’,” tried to find out solutions to the practical dilemmas posed by transitions. Rather 
than creating an ideal type, knowledge base of this field depended on the comparison between 
different experiences of countries (Arthur, 2009:324-326).  
10 There are several reasons for adoption of this term. The populations living in such countries 
where regime change took place were aiming at democratic reform. In addition to this, there was 
need for a new paradigm to succeed the earlier theories of democratization affiliated with 
modernization theory. The term “transition” which was mainly used by Marxists, was 
appropriated and its meaning was altered to signify “political reform”, namely changes in the 
legal-institutional level. Moreover, the decline of global left in1970s, the resulting interest in 
human rights among left-wing intellectuals to criticize state violence and the encounters of 
intellectuals in exile with social democratic experiences contributed to the articulation of the 
phrase “transition” to political democracy (Arthur, 2009:337-341). 
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procedures and practices of democratic citizenship”.11 The main actors of 
transition were seen as elites whose aim was to pursue-legal institutional reform 
(Arthur, 2009: 347). Exclusion of socio-economic transformation rendered the 
‘transitional justice’ framework a partial one.12 
 The understanding of the conception of transitional justice is still 
incomplete and thin. A systematic conceptualization of the term has not been 
fully developed yet (De Greiff, 2012: 32). There is no fixed meaning of the term. 
Some scholars (Teitel, 2003; Uprimny and Saffon, 2006) state that transitional 
justice is a “distinct phenomena”. Some (Posner and Vermeule, 2004:764) 
indicate that it is “continuous with ordinary justice”, not creating a distinctive 
set of political and jurisprudential dilemmas.13  Some (De Greiff, 2012: 64) view 
it as “general understanding of justice applied to peculiar circumstances”. Others 
(Allen, 1999; Teitel, 2002; Uprimny and Saffon, 2006) express that it is a 
compromise shaped by the political contingency.  
 What is common in most of the definitions of transitional justice is “to 
address past human rights abuses in the context of a shift in political order” 
(Apland, 2012). Therefore, transitional justice can be defined as set of practices, 
mechanisms and concerns which aims at confronting and dealing with past 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law (Roth-Arriaza, 2006:2).  
 Most of the time transitional justice is informed by the tension between 
peace and justice, the international and the local, retribution and restoration, and 
law and politics. The choice of the mechanisms and practices is influenced by 
                                                          
11 Although transition to democracy was seen desirable, the scholars dealing with this issue such 
as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1995) suggest that it is uncertain that these regimes in transition 
would actually become democracies.  
12 There are some challenges to transitional justice. The first point is whether the types of justice 
claims should be shaped by the end point of transition (i.e. democracy, peace). For example, 
“why some measures such as legal reforms was seen as proper transitional justice measures 
whereas redistribution of wealth is not” had been a challenge. Secondly, the Latin American 
influence on the field raised questions of whether this framework would be relevant for countries 
with different, histories, cultures and positions in the world economy. Another challenge was the 
limitations of the transitions paradigm in terms of its applicability to places where there is no 
transition but an historical injustice. The failure of some countries in the mid 1990s who were in 
the process of transition to democracy also debilitated the “transition to democracy paradigm”. 
Some argue that transitional justice paradigm is affected by a particular political project 
(democratization) of specific actors (US based democracy promoting organizations), therefore 
not credible. Finally, there is also a growing anti impunity movement, based on international law 
and principles, which is called international justice. It poses another challenge to this field. It is 
unclear whether the field would endure these challenges (Arthur, 2009:359-363).  
13 Posner and Vermeule (2004) argue that the problems of justice in transitional times, is not 
strictly disparate from the problems of justice in ordinary times. Both of them are shaped by 
moral compromises and critical moral judgements. The difference is not one of kind but degree 
(Williams and Nagy, 2012:22). 
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these tensions. Thus, a plausible account of transitional justice should be able to 
consider dilemmas involved and regard it “as a negotiation between normative 
and political forces; the infusion of moral (and legal) considerations into what is 
an inherently political project” (Apland, 2012). It might be this sort of 
negotiation, which makes transitional justice distinct despite being thin and 
incomplete.  
 The objectives of transitional justice, according to the UN, are “to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. Other goals are listed as 
providing recognition to victims, fostering civic trust, and contributing to 
reconciliation and democratization (De Greiff, 2012: 40). Adorno states that the 
“past will have been worked through only when the causes of what happened 
then have been eliminated” (2010: 227). Therefore, the goals of transitional 
justice should be able to address underlying causes of what happened.  
 Transitional justice measures were determined by the meaning associated 
with the term “transition” in the emergence of the field (Arthur, 2009: 326). A 
non-exhaustive list includes criminal prosecutions, truth telling, reparations, and 
institutional reform (De Greiff, 2012: 40). In the broader sense, it includes a 
multitude of approaches such as changes in the representation of the issue in the 
school textbooks, creation of memorials and museums, commemoration and 
designing a more just distribution of resources (Roth-Arriaza, 2006:2). 
 These measures, far from being randomly chosen, share some common 
goals such as accountability and serving justice. “International experience 
suggests that if these measures are implemented haphazardly, piecemeal and in 
isolation from one another, it is less likely that they will be interpreted as 
instances of justice” (De Greiff, 2012:36).14 
 Although there are four transitional justice measures, in the context of the 
limitations and aims of this study, only two of them, namely prosecutions (trials) 
and truth commissions will be examined. 
Trials vs. Truth Commissions 
 Some accounts of transitional justice suggest that demands of justice15 and 
the needs of peace and reconciliation push in opposite directions (Uprimny and 
Saffon, 2006:2). It has been assumed that the pursuit of criminal justice can 
disturb fragile political settlements and deepen societal divisions. Therefore, 
                                                          
14 Orentlicher (2004:5) states in “Independent Study on Best Practices, Including 
Recommendations, To Assist States in Strengthening Their Domestic Capacity To Combat All 
Aspects of Impunity” that “[a]n effective policy requires a multifaceted strategy, with each 
component playing a necessary but only partial role….truth commissions, prosecutions and 
reparations are widely seen as complementary, each playing a distinctly important role”. 
15 This is individualizing the crime and punishing the perpetrators. 
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repairing the social ties damaged by the war or authoritarian regimes was seen as 
requiring sacrificing justice understood as punitive measures.16  
 To provide a moral justification for sacrificing of retributive justice, 
disclosure of truth has been used as a replacement in some of the contexts, as in 
the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the 
TRC). This practice created what is referred to as the “truth vs. justice” 
dilemma. It was thought that if the justice mechanisms depend on punitive 
measures, the disclosure of the truth would be less likely because offenders 
would not have motivation to reveal what happened, how and when.  
 However, in recent years, it has been seen that the dichotomy between the 
truth and justice is fallacious (Lutz, 2006:327). Although the government might 
have some leeway in deciding in what order, when and how to implement 
transitional justice measures, it is now accepted that overlooking any of them 
might upset the political environment. In a similar vein, I would argue that 
prosecutions and truth commissions are not alternatives to each other but are 
complementary mechanisms. As it will be shown below, there are some 
important differences between courts and truth commissions as well as 
similarities. These differences underlie the fact that truth commissions can be 
necessary under the circumstances where there are prosecutions (and vice-versa).  
 Both truth commissions and courts provide truth, justice, reform, 
reparations, public debate, and the validation of victims’ experiences 
[recognition] (Freeman, 2006:73). Both of these institutions try to redirect the 
revenge through public legal institutions (Minow, 2000: 254). Although a truth 
commission is victim-centred and trials focus on perpetrators, both bodies try to 
engage related parties to their respective practices. Therefore, it can be said that 
courts and truth commissions try to meet all these objectives in varying manners 
and degrees.  
 There are also some differences between truth commissions and courts. 
Truth commissions are tasked with investigation and reporting of the facts; 
therefore there are generally no plaintiffs, no prosecution, no defence and no trial 
(Freeman, 2006:71).17 Courts and truth commissions differ from each other in 
terms of their consequences. The judgment of the court is legally binding. The 
findings of the truth commission have no intrinsic legal effect (Freeman, 
2006:71). Trials try to establish individual responsibility, therefore “take events 
                                                          
16 [I]mpunity was seen as a necessary political compromise…[sometimes] ‘price of peace’ 
(Wilson, 2003:368). 
17 South Africa is an exception in terms of the amnesty hearings, as amnesty hearings had a 
format similar to courts. 
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out of its social context” (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010:14).18 However, truth 
commissions try to determine the broader social context that enables the 
violation and roles of the actors other than perpetrators such as institutions and 
bystanders (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010:14); therefore they have a potential to 
demonstrate collective responsibility as well as the individual one unlike the 
individualization of responsibility in trials. It is generally suggested that trials are 
backward looking where as truth commissions are forward-looking in terms of 
aiming at social renewal (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010:10). Truth commissions 
reach far more people (victims, witnesses and perpetrators) compared to trials. 
What distinguishes truth commissions from trials is balancing the independent 
forces of both justice and reconciliation (Allen, 1999:320). 
 Before analysing whether a truth commission should be established in 
Turkey to complement the prosecution and whether some of the methods used 
and justice principles adopted in the TRC can be applied to Turkey, basic 
features of case studies, namely relevant historical background of Africa and 
Turkey will be examined in the next section.  
2. TRANSITIONAL CONTEXTS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS OF 
SOUTH AFRICA AND TURKEY 
 Although Turkey and South Africa have different histories, there are some 
similarities between these countries when it comes to the experience of large-
scale human rights violations at some point of their history. As the detailed 
analysis of these countries’ histories is beyond this article’s scope, only the 
dimensions of their history, which are relevant for the aims of this article, will be 
summarized below. 
 Africa was not ruled by a military regime but a civilian government. In 
Turkey, it was the military that saw itself as “the guardian of the Turkish State” 
(Savran 2002) and was involved in politics directly or indirectly in the presence 
of civilian governments (Ahmad 2010; Zurcher 2004). Nevertheless, both the 
apartheid regime19 and the military regime in Turkey in the 1980s were 
                                                          
18 It indirectly contributes to explaining broader social causes of the violations. 
19 Racism and oppression manifested themselves in different forms in South Africa with the 
beginning of colonialism. The white supremacist acts and practices were formulized as a 
“concerted ideology and overarching plan of segregation” only in the beginning of the twentieth 
century (Worden 2012, pp.74 -88). The hegemony of the white population and segregation of a 
very large majority of the population were reinforced through constitutions in the twentieth 
century (De Lange 2000, p.16). In the late 1940s, segregation was revived in the form of 
apartheid policy (Worden 2012, pp.74-88). Apartheid was “the system of institutionalised racism 
and racial and social engineering” (Posel 2011, p.319). It was based on “minority domination of 
statutorily defined colour groups on a territorial, residential, political, social and economic basis” 
(Boraine 2000, p.141). It lasted for nearly fifty years. The durability of the system did not imply 
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authoritarian and undemocratic based on tight control over state apparatus and 
the exclusion of large proportions of people from the rule during certain periods.  
 Although the common point in two cases is vertical violence through the 
direct and indirect participation of state apparatus, the natures of the conflict in 
the two countries were different. In Africa, there was an organized armed 
struggle against the repressive policies of the government based on race (skin 
colour). The struggle of these armed groups gained international support 
(Worden 2012). In Turkey, there were revolutionary leftist associations, which 
have considerable societal base and organized around class-based objectives in the 
1970s. There were ultra-nationalist organizations and paramilitary groups 
fighting with them. Organizations from both these camps used arms for different 
reasons in varying degrees and forms (Ahmad 2010; Zurcher 2004). Although 
the revolutionary leftists’ cause did not get international support, the 
paramilitary groups got support from the US through funds and training (Ahmad 
2010). 
 In the South African context, the NP (the National Party) and 
organizations struggling against apartheid were unable to defeat each other; 
therefore they negotiated for peace (Worden 2012).20 In the Turkish context, the 
revolutionary leftists as well as the ultranationalists were repressed by the state in 
1980s. The military took control of the state. The revolutionary left did not have 
a say in the creation of new order whereas the leader of ultranationalists said, 
“we are in jail, but our ideas are in power” (Ahmad, 2010:95-96).  
 The negotiation process in South Africa was one of the most participatory 
and democratic among the transitions from authoritarian rule (Boraine, 2000; 
Hayner, 2000; Wilson, 2001a; Wilson, 2001b). The parties of the conflict 
reached a consensus on the amnesty outside the official consultative process 
(Wilson, 2001a:8). However, the conditions for amnesty and its combination 
with a truth commission were shaped by the limited but significant contributions 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that it was internally stable, coherent and uncontested (Posel 2011, p.320). The common ground 
was sustaining white supremacy by disenfranchising Africans (Worden 2012, pp.101-102).  
20 In 1989, F.W. de Klerk, the new head of the NP, won the elections and started to lift repressive 
measures. In 1990, the ANC and some other organizations were unbanned. The political 
prisoners, including Mandela, were released. In 1991, the main elements of apartheid legislation 
were removed. The formal negotiation between the government and some other parties such as 
the ANC for the new constitution took place in 1991. In September 1992, a Record of 
Understanding had been reached by the ANC. It resulted in the issuing of a new democratic 
constitution in 1993 and the election of ANC-led government in 1994 (Worden 2012, pp.131-
152). Despite the persistence of economic and social problems, apartheid was broken down and 
the transition began (Boraine 2000, p.142).  
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of the civil society (Wilson, 2001b:200). A truth commission was created a few 
years after the conflict ended, based on the act of the parliament (Boraine, 
2000:145). 
 In Turkey, the prosecution started 32 years after the coup d’état happened. 
The lifting of the ban on prosecution of the 1980 coup leaders was accepted in 
the public referendum in 2010. Nevertheless, some victims’/survivors’ groups might 
feel excluded as no one asked their ideas and suggestions about how they would 
like to deal with the past abuses besides criminal trials in Turkey. 
 Both the truth commission in South Africa and prosecution regarding the 
12 September 1980 coup d’état in Turkey can be interpreted as a part of “new 
nation-building” (Wilson 2001a; Laciner 2012:3-7) and both of these processes 
are shaped by economic, social and political interests.  
 The TRC did not take the apartheid regime to trial, but rather 
“documented gross human rights violations committed during the maintaining 
and fighting against apartheid” (Ally cited in Wilson 2001a: 48). Turkey did not 
put the 12 September 1980 regime or the coup d’état mentality on trial, but 
charged “two generals with overthrowing the parliament and constitutional 
order in a military coup” and handed down life sentences to them.  
 These differences and similarities of the historical background and transitional 
context listed above are important in terms of affecting of the choice of transitional 
justice measures in these countries. As Teitel indicates “response to transition is 
contingent on a number of factors— the affected society’s legacies of injustice, its 
legal culture, and political traditions— as well as on the exigencies of its 
transitional political circumstance” (2000:219).21 
 Whereas the factors explained above led to the creation of a truth 
commission in South Africa, in Turkey prosecution was adopted. Zalaquett 
notes that “in cases where a clear victor emerges, no truth commission is 
established. The winners simply prosecute the losers. Truth commissions have 
been established in situations where there is no clear victor” (cited in Freeman, 
2006:11). Therefore, the prosecution might be explained with the defeat of 
authoritarian modernist bourgeois by the conservative modernist bourgeois in 
                                                          
21 It is also noted that “the strength and legitimacy of legal institutions”,  “the strength of 
democracy prior to conflict”, “the legacy of colonialism” “international intervention in the 
country”, “the commitment of governing parties to confront the past”, “interventions since the 
transition to democracy to address underlying structures and power inequities that contributed to 
the conflict” and  “timing (time since the onset of transition period and its relevance to 
addressing the articulated needs of the survivors)” are among factors that affect of the choice of 
transitional justice measures in each society (Fletcher, L.E., Weinstein, H.M. and Rowen, J.,  
2009:190). 
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Turkey (Laçiner, 2012:3-7). Nevertheless, despite providing a possible 
explanation of why there is no truth commission in Turkey, Zalaquett’s 
comment does not account for why there should not or should be a truth 
commission. I will clarify why there should be a truth commission, 
complementary to the prosecution in Turkey below.  
3. THE LIMITATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE INDICTMENT 
AND PROSECUTIONS IN TURKEY 
 Turkey's army has staged three “classic” coups and a “post-modern” one 
since 1960. The 1980 coup was the bloodiest in Turkey's modern history.  
A total of 650,000 people were detained during this period and records were 
kept on 1,683,000 people and kept on file at police stations. A total of 230,000 
people were tried in 210,000 cases, mostly for political reasons. A further 517 
people were sentenced to death, while 7,000 people faced charges that carried a 
sentence of capital punishment. Of those who received the death penalty, 50 
were executed. As a result of unsanitary and inhumane living conditions and 
torture in prisons, a further 299 people died while in custody.22 
 All political parties, trade unions and civil society organizations were 
banned,23 archives of some of the parties were disappeared, newspapers were 
closed down and journalists were arrested. 
 Following the coup, in 1982 a new constitution was accepted in a 
referendum  (Ahmad, 1985:214-215) (getting % 91.4 vote).24 The provisional 
Article 15 of the new constitution prevented any prosecution against those 
responsible for the 1980 coup.25 
                                                          
22 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=268151 
23 It was stated that the number of the banned parties, trade unions and organization amount to 
24.000. However, organizations of big businesses such as TUSIAD were not closed down.  
24 It should be noted that voting in the referendum was compulsory. There a was fine for those 
who would not vote, in addition to the suspension of right to vote for five years. The “no” votes 
were relatively higher in the Southeast part of Turkey (Zurcher, 2004:281).  
25 Provisional Article 15 of 1982 Constitution: “No allegation of criminal, financial or legal 
responsibility shall be made, nor shall an application be filed with a court for this purpose against 
any decision or measure whatsoever taken by the National Security Council formed under Act 
Nr. 2356 which has been exercising legislative and executive power on behalf of the Turkish 
nation from 12 September 1980 to the date of the formation of the Presidium of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey which is to convene following the first general elections; or against 
any government formed during the term of office of the Council; or against the Consultative 
Assembly which has exercised its functions under Act Nr. 2485 on the Constituent Assembly.  
Provisions of the above paragraphs shall also apply in respect of persons who have taken 
decisions and adopted or implemented measures as part of the implementation of such decisions 
and measures by the administration or by the competent organs authorities and officials. No 
allegation of unconstitutionality shall be made against decisions or measures taken under laws or 
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 After 32 years, in March 2010 the Justice and Development Party proposed 
a constitutional amendment package including a change in the Provisional 
Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution. It was voted in the referendum on 12 
September 2010 and the 57.88% of the electorate voted in favour of the 
amendment. Following the amendment, complaints were filed against two 
surviving leaders of the coup and an indictment was prepared. Kenan Evren and 
Tahsin Sahinkaya were “charged with overthrowing the parliament and 
constitutional order in a military coup”.  
 The prosecution process in Turkey started on 4 April 2012 and the court 
delivered the judgement on 18 June 2014. Ankara 10th high “criminal court in 
Ankara gave “life sentences to retired generals Kenan Evren and Tahsin 
Şahinkaya, who led the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup, on charges of violating 
Article 146 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), which concerns “crimes 
committed against state forces… in accordance with the court's ruling, Evren -- 
also the seventh president of Turkey -- and Şahinkaya, then-commander of the 
Turkish Air Force, will be stripped of their military rank and demoted to 
private.”26 Now the case is in the appeal process.  
 The decision of the court is a milestone in terms of bringing coup d’état 
generals to justice, finding them guilty and giving them life sentences. It has been 
an important first step in the fight for ending impunity. Confirming Malamud-
Goti’s views on criminal trials (1995: 200), it has shaken the dominant position 
of the generals and made them accountable citizens. However, when the extent 
and type of atrocities (severity of violations) committed by military junta and its 
accomplices are taken into account neither the prosecution process nor the 
judgment can be seen as adequate. It does not only stem from the specific 
limitations and shortcomings of the indictment and prosecution process in 
Turkey, but also from the limitations of prosecutions in general. General 
limitations of prosecutions in the context of transitional justice will not be 
discussed here; only the ones that correspond to the case in Turkey will be given 
place below.   
 The indictment27 regarding the coup d’état on 12 September 1980 claims 
that the coup was the result of the actions of ‘deep’ illegal structures within the 
state which aimed at preparing grounds for a successful military takeover by 
creating a chaotic environment through planning and conducting terrorist 
                                                                                                                                                                    
decrees having force of law enacted during this period or under Act Nr. 2324 on the 
Constitutional Order.”  
26http://www.todayszaman.com/_turkish-court-hands-down-life-sentence-to-sept-12-coup-
generals_350670.html 
27 Full text of “the indictment of 12 September Coup D’état” could be reach from the following 
link: http://hepimizdavaciyiz.net/?s=12-eylul-iddianamesi 
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actions. There is an implication about the role of the military in stirring up 
political turmoil in the late 1970s.  
 The indictment depends on “conservative-liberal (right-wing) interpretation 
of the history” (İnsel 2012:12) because of its democracy definition, depicting 
socialist experiences as detrimental practices and regarding the conscious 
struggles of some social movements as provocations of a ‘deep state’. 
 The scope of the indictment is very narrow. Some intervening lawyers 
raised this concern in the first few hearings of the trial. The roles of political, 
economic and social actors - such as heads and members of other governmental 
institutions, business associations and the media - and many other incidents 
related to the coup in different geographical locations in Turkey have been 
overlooked by the indictment. It can be said that the indictment is seen as 
vindicating the 12 September 1980 regime only by accusing two generals and 
excluding the broader social context. 28 Therefore, there is strong evidence that 
the limited space provided by this trial is inadequate to reveal the complexity of 
12 September 1980 coup d’état. Since the court has to simplify complexity with a 
view to producing a “single outcome”, namely to do “justice” (Maier 2000:267), 
“the simplistic questions of guilt or innocence framed by criminal trial can never 
capture the multiple sources of mass violence” (Minow 2000:238).  
 The indictment includes the testimonies of victims who were tortured in 
detention centres and prisons and touches on different methods of torture. It 
acknowledges that there was a conscious and systematic use of torture in 
detention centres and prisons. However, the generals are not charged with 
torture, which is included in the “crimes against humanity” under Article 77 of 
the Turkish Penal Code. During the court hearings, some intervening lawyers 
called for the investigation to include crimes against humanity (T.C. Ankara 12. 
Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi, 2012a). In the third hearing, the 12th High Criminal 
Court in Ankara decided to file a criminal complaint against coup d’état generals 
for committing human rights violations such as systematic torture (T.C. Ankara 
12. Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi, 2012b). The investigations of generals with regards to 
torture are unclear yet. Although torture and death in custody complaints filed in 
Ankara were referred to prosecutors’ offices in 59 relevant provinces of Turkey29, 
                                                          
28 Other criminal investigations were opened against the officers (other perpetrators/accomplices) 
who were involved in committing the crime (M.Horuş, 2014, Personal Communication, 2 
October).  
29 “After indicting the two surviving leaders of the coup, he [prosecutor Kemal Çetin] issued a 
decision of non-jurisdiction for many complaints filed in Ankara for cases of torture and deaths 
in custody which took place in many parts of the country, including in Ankara, in the wake of 
the coup. Instead, he referred these complaints to prosecutors’ offices in the provinces of Turkey 
[59 provinces] in which the incidents originally occurred and to the relevant Ankara prosecutor 
for the Ankara cases. Furthermore, he argued his decision of non-jurisdiction the basis of the 
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local courts in Samsun, Diyarbakır, Amasya and Bursa dismissed the cases as 
time-barred, despite the fact that they should not be subjected to statute of 
limitations. A case in Kırklareli continues. Lawyers demanded recusation in 
another case in Amasya (M. Horuş, 2014, Personal Communication, 2 October). 
Considering the trajectory of these cases, it cannot be said that they offered a 
“disapproval of official policies” and “promote confidence in the new political 
arrangements” (Malamud-Goti, 1989 cited in Arthur, 2009: 355). Dismissal of 
some cases about crimes against humanity by the local courts due to statute of 
limitations are not in accordance with international law and by doing so, the 
local courts have been protecting the perpetrators and therefore, contributing to 
impunity. 
 The Court collected the evidence through witnesses, records and exhibits.30 
Even though evidences gathered by the court- as the intervening lawyers agree- 
are adequate to establish whether generals are guilty or not (which is the primary 
purpose of the trial), they are not sufficient to reveal underlying reasons for the 
coup d’état. More importantly, this information does not account for why gross 
human rights violations had happened. One of the intervening lawyers Mehmet 
Horuş stated that the Court confirmed the previously known facts, more than 
uncovering new information. He added that the court did not create a casual link 
between the coup d’état and human rights violations (2014, Personal 
Communication, 2 October). Although criminal trials can establish “tangible 
facts about past crimes” (Malamud-Goti, 1989 cited in Arthur 2009:355), 
considering the severity of violations such as unlawful killings, torture and 
enforced disappearances, the evidence gathered by the court only very partially 
established tangible facts about gross human rights violations resulted from the coup.  
 The defendants did not attend to the trial and delivered their testimonies at 
the 10th and 11th hearings of the trial via teleconference on the pretext of ill health 
and age considerations.31 The generals did not accept the legitimacy of authority 
putting them on trial. They argued that they constituted a “founding 
government” and the Constitution they made is still in place, therefore the Court 
has no jurisdiction to hear the case and only history can judge them (T.C. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and Turkey’s obligations under the ECHR that 
torture and violations of the right to life (articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR) were crimes for which the 
statute of limitations could not apply.” (HRW, 2012: 7).  
30 A detailed list of evidences can be found in the justified decision of the Court.  
31 In the first few hearings, some of the intervening lawyers and parties stated that poor health 
should not afford coup d’état generals a pretext for absence in the court and health reports should 
be requested from institutions other than the Forensic Medicine Institute. The Court accepted it 
and health reports from the hospitals of two universities did not change the result. Although 
some of the lawyers demanded generals’ arrest, they were only placed a ban on leaving the 
country (T.C. Ankara 12. Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi, 2012a). 
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Ankara 10. Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi, 2014).32 They pleaded not guilty. As they did 
not consider themselves as defendants, they refused to answer the questions 
asked by the court during direct examination (Evren interfered only a few times). 
Although intervening lawyers (and some of the survivors/victims) pressed them 
to talk about death sentences, death in custody and torture in prison among the 
other issues during cross-examination, they kept their silence (T.C. Ankara 10. 
Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi, 2014). They showed no remorse and did not respond to 
questions related to forgiveness and apology. 
 Abovementioned facts lead to some defects in the trial. As the generals 
refuse to answer the questions about coup d’état charges, in contrast with Slye’s 
argument about criminal trials (2000:171-172), the trial was unable to supply 
more reliable information by direct testimony of the accused. In addition to this, 
despite the fact that criminal trials enable a space for formal dialogue between 
victims and the accused (Slye, 2000:172) the absence of the generals during the 
most of the hearings and their refusal to answer the questions asked by 
victims/survivors resulted in the lack of a formal dialogue between them and 
victims/survivors. Similar to Maier’s concerns about the perpetrators’ tactics to 
distance themselves from their identities as violators (2000:267), the coup d’état 
generals refused accusations of torture and blamed prison officers for it. They did 
not accept their identity as human rights offenders. They tried to keep their 
immunity by participating via teleconference and by not accepting the legitimacy 
of authority putting them on trial. 
 During the hearings, except asking questions, victims/survivors of the 12 
September coup d’état talked about human rights violations which they/their 
relatives were exposed to in order to prove that they are victims of crime of the 
coup d’état so that they would be involved in the case. However, most of the 
time it was lawyers who spoke in the name of them.  Since the court were trying 
to establish whether the generals are guilty of coup d’état crime or not, 
victims’/survivors’ say and the attention given to them were limited. The court 
was not an ideal environment for victims/survivors to share their plight.  
                                                          
32 “The defense statement was prepared by Bülent Hayri Acar, a lawyer for Evren and retired 
Gen. Ali Tahsin Şahinkaya. The defense statement was published as a booklet. Evren demanded 
his acquittal, arguing that the 1980 government was a “founding” government, and the Turkish 
Penal Code (TCK) does not explicitly forbid staging a takeover. He argued that there is no legal 
order in the world that forbids staging coups as a de facto necessity that arises from the nature of 
overtaking an older government. He said as long as “the power that stages the coup” is not 
eliminated, it should be considered a founding government. He maintained that since the 1982 
Constitution, adopted as a result of the 1980 generals' two-year military rule, is still in place and 
all other legislation is based on it, this means the intervention is still legitimate. “This trial is not 
valid,” he said, arguing that it was “against reason” to consider the intervention a crime.” Please 
see: http://www.todayszaman.com/_1980-coup-leaders-defense-arguments-not-legally-
sound_274954.html. 
AP   coming to terms with  
  the 12 september coup d’état 
 
 It was stated that some victims/survivors welcomed the decision of the 
court (M. Horuş, 2014, Personal Communication, 2 October). Nevertheless, the 
violations such as deprivation of liberty, mental anguish and loss of life might 
constitute “pain and suffering that can never be compensated” (Maier, 
2000:269). Therefore, the retributive measures can only partially provide redress 
for pain and suffering (Maier, 2000:269) the coup d’état caused on 
victims/survivors.  
4. ASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND 
METHODS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION TO TURKEY IN THE TERMS OF COMING TO TERMS 
WITH 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 COUP D’ÉTAT 
 As it is demonstrated above, the trial regarding 12 September coup d’état 
was not a case involving crimes against humanity. Cases referred to local courts 
about crimes against humanity were either dismissed due to statute of limitations 
or are slowly progressing. The 12 September 1980 case excluded the roles of 
political, economic and social actors and the broader social context of the coup 
d’état. The tangible facts about gross human rights violations resulted from the 
coup d’état were only fragmentally revealed. The limited attention given to 
victims/survivors seems to be inadequate to recognize their plight. Therefore, in 
my view, such deficiencies and limitations of the prosecution can be recovered 
by public, institutional and thematic hearings in the context of a truth 
commission. In the following part, this argument will be elaborated by 
examining which methods and principles adopted in the TRC might be applied 
to Turkey. 
The TRC Combined An Amnesty Process With The Truth Commission 
 The main issue for the first post-apartheid government in South Africa was 
formulating a “morally acceptable” amnesty requirement since the conditions 
and procedures for granting amnesty were not clarified in the Interim 
Constitution. The solution was incorporating amnesty with a truth commission 
(Hayner 2011:100).33 A technical committee was appointed by the main 
negotiators to draft a “post-amble” to the Constitution, which would include an 
amnesty clause.34 Therefore, an amnesty clause was prepared outside the official 
consultative process (Wilson, 2001a:8). 
 The unique feature of the TRC was combining an amnesty process with the 
                                                          
33 “A grant of amnesty would be the carrot to get perpetrators’ cooperation in the process, and 
the threat of prosecution would be the stick” (Hayner, 2011:100) 
34 The Committee prepared the post-amble entitled “National Unity and Reconciliation” just 
after the end of the Constitutional talks and before the Constitution were brought to Parliament 
in December 1993 (Wilson, 2001a:8). 
Gülden Gürsoy ATAMAN          alternatif politika  
Cilt 6, Sayı 3, Aralık 2014 
  
441 
 
truth commission (Slye 2000; Wilson 2001a; Hayner 2011).35 The reconciliation 
was initially aimed to be reached through “amnesty” (Wilson 2001b, p.198).36 
Amnesty was associated with the disclosure of truth later through the TRC 
(Hayner, 2011:27). 
 The Committee on Amnesty (the AC) was tasked with the examination of 
applications for amnesty through hearings. Amnesty hearings were similar to 
court hearings.37 The main aim of the hearings was establishing the full truth 
through perpetrators’ testimonies before granting amnesty. The amnesty process was 
viewed as the best possible opportunity to learn more about obscure incidents 
(Wilson, 2001a:23) as the judges of the old regime were not dislodged by the 
new regime (Greenawalt, 2000:209) and the judicial system was weak. 
 The way that the TRC granted amnesty was legally the most stringent of 
amnesties applied in different transitional contexts (Wilson, 2001a). It was an 
individualized amnesty. The applicants had to demonstrate that the violations 
were committed for political reasons in the time period specified in the Act. 
There had to be proportionality between the act and the political objective. 
Perpetrators had to provide full disclosure with respect to the nature and context 
of their actions.38 The legal proceedings against the perpetrators were suspended 
until the amnesty application was considered and the case was concluded. The 
refusal of amnesty meant that criminal and civil prosecutions could be pursued 
against the perpetrators (Wilson, 2001a; Hayner, 2011). 
 There were some drawbacks of the amnesty process. Firstly, amnesty is a 
violation of state’s duty to punish individuals responsible for certain gross 
violations of human rights under international law. Granting amnesty led to the 
indemnifying the state for the damages, especially with regards to the crimes 
perpetrated by government officials (Wilson, 2001a:24). Secondly, the TRC 
named the perpetrators and granted them amnesty by bypassing due process 
requirements. Despite the similarities with the courts, standard legal rules of 
evidence were not followed here. Thirdly, there were inconsistencies and 
controversies in amnesty rulings. Since the AC was an administrative tribunal, 
there was lack of jurisprudence in the decisions. The criterion of proportionality 
                                                          
35 In many countries amnesty process was a separate legal mechanism. 
36 By upholding amnesty in the post- amble, the Constitution gave precedence to “national unity 
and reconciliation” more than “protecting individuals’ rights”, especially individual’s right to 
justice (Wilson, 2001a:9). 
37 These hearings were different than public hearings, institutional hearings and thematic 
hearings. 
38 The consequence of noncompliance with the requirement was not clarified in any single 
regulation (Sarkin 2008:102-103). The standard about full disclosure was later made clear by the 
TRC in its 2003 report. However, this was a late clarification and did not prevent the 
inconsistency in the application of the notion of full disclosure. 
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for granting amnesty was implemented in very few decisions39 and the criterion 
political objective40 was defined and applied narrowly (Sarkin 2008, p.98).41 
Fourthly, perpetrators needed to associate their acts with the political objective 
to benefit from amnesty. This criterion sometimes led to either overrating or 
undervaluing their political motivations (Slye, 2000:177). Moreover, it was 
contested whether the perpetrators disclosed all the relevant facts about the cases 
considered by the AC (Slye, 2000:177). The insufficient resources and limited 
investigative capacities of the Investigative Unit as well as the lack of 
information coming from victims and perpetrators affected the establishment of 
the factual truth about the case (Sarkin, 2008:94-105). Lastly, the amnesty 
process did not place a moral burden on the perpetrators: regret and apology 
were not required (Wilson, 2001a). This hindered a true reconciliation.  
 It should be noted that amnesty for gross violations of human rights is not a 
widely accepted option for truth commissions since amnesty provisions have 
been regarded as violating international law.42 A duty not to grant amnesty is 
inferred from “international norms requiring states to provide victims with 
remedies for human rights violations, or to prosecute perpetrators, as well as 
from specific provisions in treaties on torture, forced disappearances, genocide 
and certain war crimes” (Lutz, 2006:330).43  
                                                          
39 Most of the time the AC exercised discretion (Sarkin 2008, p.98). 
40 Political objective was generally interpreted as to “whether an authorized superior in a 
recognized political organization ordered the act, or whether the act was closely related to an 
explicit programmatic statement of an established political organization” (Slye 2000b, pp.179-
180), although there were other factors set forth in the law to determine the element of political 
objective. Other factors stipulated in the Article 20(3) of the NURA includes motive of the 
person committing the act, the context in which the act took place and the proportionality with 
the act and the objective pursued.  
41 The murderers of Steve Biko were not granted amnesty since perpetrators claimed that the 
killing was accidental. The abuses related to simple racism were not granted amnesty because it 
was asserted that political objective was not present in these acts. Sometimes the committee did 
not follow the procedures for granting amnesty: there was no hearing for the thirty seven ANC 
leaders which committed gross human rights violations; the case was considered in the 
chambers. Because of these inconsistencies, some of the rulings of the AC were subjected to 
judicial review (Hayner 2011, p.30). 
42There is an increasing international normative consensus that perpetrators of gross violations of 
human rights should be held responsible by states. The “Pinochet Effect” (Roth-Arriaza, 2005 
cited in Lutz 2006:329), the indictment issued in Spain against General Pinochet of Chile for 
human rights violations he committed in Chile and the House of Lord’s decision that could be 
extradited from the UK because torture constitutes an extradition crime, and therefore would be 
tried in Spain, has shown that it is becoming more difficult for perpetrators of gross human rights 
violators to avoid responsibility by leaving their countries. The possibility of trials for such 
persons abroad motivated some states to prevent immunity at home and prosecute perpetrators 
so as to protect their sovereignty (Lutz, 2006:329). 
43 These norms could be found in the following treaties: Convention Against Torture, Art.5; 
Genocide Convention, Art. 5; Geneva Convention I, Art. 49, II Art.50, III, Art. 129, Art. 146. 
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 Considering the drawbacks of granting amnesty listed above, unlike the 
TRC, an amnesty process should not be combined with a truth commission and 
amnesty should not be granted to perpetrators who have committed gross human 
rights violations during the 12 September 1980 Coup D’état.44 A combination of 
a truth commission with amnesty in South Africa was historically and politically 
contingent. Therefore, it might not be relevant for each and every society. 
Granting amnesty for perpetrators who committed crimes against humanity may 
be a violation of states’ duty to punish individuals responsible for gross violations 
of human rights under international law. It can lead to the indemnifying the 
state, especially with regards to the crimes perpetrated by government officials. 
The South African case as well as other examples in the post-socialist countries 
demonstrates that “where there was little or no prosecution of the former 
authorities for past crimes… [there is] high levels of violence” (Borneman, 1997 
cited in Wilson, 2001a:26).  Thus, a truth commission should complement the 
retributive process in Turkey through removing its deficiencies rather than 
replacing it. 
 Against those who claim that amnesties (combined with truth 
commissions) are only ways to get information from the accused, it can be said 
that amnesties do not guarantee the disclosure of all relevant facts as the TRC 
experience demonstrates.  Where judicial system is strong, trials can provide 
factual information. However, because of the weaknesses of the justice system 
and problems related to hearings outlined above, it is contested to what extent 
courts in Turkey can contribute to the establishment of the truth.  
The TRC Held Public Victim Hearings, Thematic Hearings And Institutional 
Hearings In Order To Identify And Analyse Both Individual And Broader 
Social Dimensions Of The Past Abuses 
 The other Committee working under the TRC was the Committee on 
Human Rights Violations (the HRVC). The mandate of the HRVC was “to 
enquire into systematic patterns of abuse, to attempt to identify motives and 
perspectives, to establish the identity of individual and institutional perpetrators, 
to find whether violations were the result of deliberate planning on the part of 
the state or liberation movements and to designate accountability, political or 
otherwise, for gross human rights violations” (TRC, 1998:227).  
 The HRVC communicated with many state and non-state actors to 
motivate different organizations and citizens to tell their accounts of human 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Not to grant domestic amnesty for crimes such as torture can be found in the case law of ICTY 
trial chamber and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
44 It should be noted that perpetrators are not limited to the surviving coup d’état generals in 
Turkey.  
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rights violations to the Committee (TRC, 1998). It held public victim hearings. 
Fifty hearings were conducted in town halls, hospitals and churches all around 
the country in 1996 and early 1997 (Wilson 2001a:21). Two thousand of the 
victims and witnesses attended the public hearings (Hayner, 2011:28).  
 In addition to this, it held theme hearings (based on groups) and institutional 
hearings. Theme hearings covered different issues such as women as the subject 
of human rights violations, youth and children. In institutional hearings, the role 
of businesses during apartheid, the legal system, the faith communities, the 
media, the heath care sector, the involvement of the former state in chemical and 
biological warfare, the role of the armed forces, the prison system and the state 
security system were analysed. These were aiming at demonstrating how certain 
groups and institutions took part in or responded to abuses of human rights 
(Hayner, 2011:28). These hearings enabled the Commission to uncover more 
about the social context and institutional structure of apartheid, although in a 
fragmented fashion (Wilson, 2001a:35-36).  
 Over 21,000 victims and witnesses gave testimony (Hayner, 2011:28). The 
accuracy of each testimony was corroborated by the Committee. The 
investigative role enabled the HRVC to establish comprehensive documentation 
of the past, through issuing subpoenas and recording the evidence using camera 
(Wilson, 2001a: 21).45  
 The HRVC conducted public awareness activities (TRC, 1998). Every day, 
the latest news stories about the Commission and hearings were published in 
newspapers and broadcasted on TV and the radio. A TV show entitled “Truth 
Commission Special Report” was broadcasted every Sunday evening (Hayner, 
2011:28).  
 Although not many criticisms were encountered with respect to the 
hearings listed above, one of the most notable can be that a once-off testimony in 
the TRC had a limited capacity to recover victims with a personal and social 
history of human rights abuses. Revelation of truth, in some cases, reopened old 
wounds (Hamber, 2001; Hayner, 2011).  
 Similar to the TRC, public (victim) hearings, thematic hearings and 
institutional hearings can enable discovering and clarifying individual and broader 
social dimensions of the 12 September 1980 coup d’état as well as formally 
acknowledging abuses related to it.  Adorno states that the “past will have been 
worked through only when the causes of what happened then have been 
eliminated” (2010: 227). Therefore, the first step should be revealing the reasons 
                                                          
45 However, these powers, was rarely exercised in its fullest extent by the Commission, since 
reconciliation was the prioritized aim more than the disclosure of the truth (Hayner, 2011:28).  
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for the 12 September Coup D’état and large-scale abuses in order to eradicate the 
causes and guarantee their non-repetition.  
Public hearings 
 Truth commissions [through public hearings] devote much of their time and 
attention to hear, respect and respond to the needs of victims and survivors 
(Hayner, 2011:22). Public hearings enable victims/survivors to tell their stories 
and reflect their traumatic experiences to a group who take their plights seriously 
in a public forum. They also provide a sort of justice, namely “justice as 
recognition or acknowledgement” (Norval, 1998; Allen, 1999; Du Toit, 2000; 
Haldemann, 2008) by publicly recognizing injustices through public testimonies 
and accepting victims/survivors as “legitimate sources of truth” (Du Toit, 2000). 
Many of the victims/survivors of the coup in Turkey were depicted as 
“terrorists”. They were seen are less than human and deserving ill treatment and 
torture. The coup leader Evren asked in a speech in 1984: “Should we feed them 
in prison for years instead of hanging them?". In my view, public hearings in a 
future truth commission might serve as a justice measure for victims/survivors in 
Turkey by recognizing their accounts of violations resulted from the coup d’état 
publicly. They can reaffirm the equal moral standing of victims/survivors and 
thus potentially recover their dignity by treating them as legitimate sources of 
truth. However, in the absence other types of transitional justice measures such 
as prosecutions and reparations, victims might find this type of justice 
insufficient. Telling their stories might pose a risk of retraumatization; therefore 
rehabilitation measures should be taken to prevent this.46   
 In addition to it, victims’/survivors’ accounts of the coup d’état through 
public hearings in Turkey can also offer an alternative to the “conservative-
liberal (right-wing) interpretation of the history” in the indictment, as they enable 
writing of an adversarial history by giving voice to the people who were 
suppressed in the past (Maier, 2000:274).  
 Although the generals refused to accept charges of torture in the trial, 
public hearings can also end the possibility of continued denial (Hayner, 
2011:21) about human rights violations and reduce the number of lies (Ignatieff, 
1996:13) regarding the coup d’état in Turkey. 
Institutional hearings 
 Institutional hearings can reveal the responsibility of institutions such as, 
the military, the police and the judicial system for the abuses. They can also 
publicly name and shame institutions (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010:12-14). After 
                                                          
46 In addition to these, as so much time has passed, some of the victims might not want to tell 
their stories.  
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the 1982 Constitution passed, the president of TISK (the Confederation of 
Employers’ Union), said that: “Up until today it was the workers who rejoiced. 
Now it is our turn.” (Savran, 2002:16). There are other business associations and 
professional groups who supported the coup by their discourses or contributed to 
it through their professional practices. Therefore, the role of the business, the 
legal system, the faith communities, the media, and the heath care sector, the 
role of armed forces, the prison system, the state security system and other 
related institutions can be revealed by conducting institutional hearings in 
Turkey.47  
Thematic hearings  
 Thematic hearings can be used to analyse how the coup d’état influenced 
different social groups in society such women, children, Alawites (Alawis), 
Kurds and LGBTT individuals. The attorney of “Black Pink Triangle”, a LGBTI 
association, states that their intervention in the case was denied on the grounds 
that they were not a legal association at the time. However, the attorney states 
that the LGBTI individuals were not allowed to use their freedom of association 
in that period, and therefore could not form a legal entity (K. Dikmen, 2014, 
Personal Communication). Limitations of the prosecution process similar to this 
can be removed by thematic hearings.  
 Lastly, the broadcasting of these hearings on T.V., as in the TRC, would be 
useful to reach the public. Despite the decline, according to a survey conducted 
by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy in 2012, TV viewing rate is quite 
high in Turkey (% 91.9).48  Therefore, consistent release of news and airing of 
news programs on truth commissions might open up a public discussion on gross 
human rights violations and raise awareness of them. 
The TRC Has Formulated Four Guiding Notions Of Truth 
 The National Unity and Reconciliation Act in the South Africa established 
the framework of truths to be produced. Each truth had to be (or about) a gross 
violation of human rights. 
 There was no single unified procedure for truth finding. Different units of 
the Commission created different definitions of truth depending on their diverse 
resources. Therefore, the TRC adopted four different guiding notions of truth 
(Wilson, 2001a:36). 
                                                          
47 Although truth commissions recommended detailed reforms for institutions responsible for 
abuses, such recommendations have not been seriously considered so far (Hayner, 2011:23).  
Therefore, a future truth commission in Turkey might consider possible monitoring mechanisms. 
48http://www.milliyet.com.tr/turk-ailesi-tv-
bagimlisi/gundem/gundemdetay/26.04.2012/1532758/default.htm%20(26) 
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 The first one was factual or forensic truth. It was “[t]he familiar legal or 
scientific notion of bringing to light factual, corroborated evidence, of obtaining 
accurate information through reliable (impartial, objective) procedures” (TRC, 
1998:111). The second one was personal and narrative truth. It was based on 
individual subjective experiences of victims and perpetrators and was produced 
through the oral tradition and storytelling. The third one was social truth. It was 
“established through interaction, discussion and debate” (TRC, 1998:113). Its 
objective was to affirm the dignity of individuals through participation. The last 
form of truth was healing and restorative truth. It aspired to situate facts within the 
context of human relationships and explained their meaning in that context, with 
a view to repair the damages done in the past and to prevent similar violations in 
the future. It was assumed that this truth would result in official 
acknowledgement and restore the dignity of victims/survivors (TRC, 1998:114).  
 There were some criticisms against the TRC’s guiding notions of truth. 
Firstly, truths defined as gross violations of human rights excluded many 
everyday injustices resulted from bureaucratic enforcement of apartheid 
(Mamdani 1996; Wilson 2001a). This made the work of the TRC less 
representative of many South Africans’ experiences (Hayner, 2011:76-77). 
Secondly, these conceptualizations were a “wobbly and poorly constructed 
conceptual grid” which was insufficient to cope with the complexity of the task 
that TRC had to fulfil (Posel, 2002: 55). Thirdly, only two paradigms of truth 
were dominant in the work of the commission: narrative truth was prioritized in 
the first year; legalistic forensic paradigm became hegemonic in the later years.49 
The knowledge about the past was created according to the forensic truth (Buur, 
1999, Wilson, 2001a, Posel, 2002,).50 Other types of truth were seen as means of 
““emotional catharsis” and nation-building” (Wilson 2001a). “It lead to an 
incomplete report which lacked any overarching and unified historical narrative, 
only a moralizing narrative predicated upon a notion of ‘evil’” (Wilson 
2001a:34). Lastly, the Final Report did not explain the relationship between the 
four categories of truth (Wilson 2001a, p.37). 
 It should be noted that the pursuit of “truth” is political in nature (De 
Brito, 1997 cited in Norval, 1998:252). Truth commissions demonstrate a 
contextual and negotiated nature of the truth of the past (Norval, 1998:252). 
Therefore, what matters in the context of truth commissions is the political 
                                                          
49 The adoption of Infocomm (information management system) changed the format that victims 
statements were taken and reduced people’s stories to the passive data (quantifiable acts). Truths 
contained in complex narratives were lost. Public hearings were not included in the information 
flow created by this system (Wilson, 2001a). 
50 It was impossible to create an “objective or forensic truth” which was not affected by local 
influences and negotiations, namely power relations in the non-ideal environment of truth 
commissions (Buur, 2002:86). 
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decision about what type of social knowledge would be offered rather than 
whether objective knowledge about the past is attainable. One of the most 
important aspects of a truth commission in Turkey would be demonstrating that 
“social knowledge is a construct” (Dimitrijevic, 2006:376).51 Many people in 
Turkey have been exposed to official truth about 12 September Coup D’état. 
Some groups gave consent to the actions of the government on the basis of these 
truths. Therefore, a future truth commission in Turkey should provide new 
truths condemning human rights violations and show that these violations have 
not been justified. 
 Four guiding notions of truth in the TRC were the products of internal 
dynamics of the TRC. Therefore, it can be said that different conceptions of truth 
to guide a future commission in Turkey would emerge from its practice. 
Nevertheless, they should allow people to reflect their subjectivities - and enable 
the re-presentations or re-interpretation of the facts, which were used to justify 
systemic use of violence (Dimitrijevic, 2006:376). 
 The mandate of a future truth commission in Turkey does not have to limit 
itself with producing a report limited to human rights violations. The TRC was 
unable to provide a plausible explanation for why the violations happened by 
failing to account for racism (Posel, 2002) and to regard apartheid as a system 
(Mamdani, 1996).  A truth commission in Turkey should produce truths 
explaining why the coup d’état was happened in order to come to terms with the 
past in-depth and to prevent repetition of such atrocities in the future.  
5. CONCLUSION 
 This research considered the question of whether the methods and 
principles of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the TRC) 
can be applied to Turkey in order to come to terms with the gross human rights 
violations resulting from the 12 September Coup d’état.  It concludes that “truth 
commission” as a transitional justice measure can be adopted in Turkey and 
complement trials due to the limitations and deficiencies of the indictment and the 
prosecution. However, the methods used and justice principles adopted in the 
TRC cannot be implemented to Turkey as a whole, since these features of the 
TRC are historically and politically contingent. 
 Truth commissions can be regarded as one step in the long process of 
reconciliation (Minow, 2000) and as “the condition under which citizens can 
trust one another as citizens again (or anew)” (De Grieff, 2012:50). Therefore, 
granting individualized amnesty for crimes against humanity (trading truth with 
                                                          
51 An example could be “identification of a victim’s status as a civilian rather than as a 
combatant” (Teitel, 2000:223).  
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amnesty) should not be implemented in Turkey; it may not conform to 
international law and by contributing to on-going legacy of impunity; it might 
cause serious problems in terms of achieving reconciliation. However, public 
(victim), institutional and thematic hearings and new truths to guide the society 
can be adopted in Turkey, since they focus on victims’ experiences, establish the 
role of institutions and other related actors in the commission of gross human 
rights violations, enable the re-presentations or re-interpretation of the facts -
which were used to justify systemic use of violence- and serve as a measure of 
justice. Although, reconciliation, forgiveness, naming of the perpetrators and 
reparation procedures are important features of the TRC, their in-depth 
discussion is beyond the limits of this study. A future research should focus on 
the victims’/survivors’ ideas and requests regarding transitional justice.  
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